

25X1A

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY

East Germany

DATE DISTR. 13 April 1953

25X1C SUBJECT

Survey of Inland Shipping During 1952

NO. OF PAGES

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1X

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

The following is a copy of a report of Section IV (Fleets and Harbors) of the Generaldirektion Schifffahrt (Directorate General, Shipping), dated 10 January 1953, which contains information on the fulfillment of shipment plans of the 1952 National Economy Plan with regard to inland shipping:

207

25X1

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISTIBU
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input type="checkbox"/>	

SECRET

25X1A

Directorate General, Shipping
Section IV - Fleet and Harbors

Berlin, 10 January 1953

25X1

Annual Analysis

Employment of Fleets

I. Breakdown of shipments for the fulfillment of the inland shipping plans of the National Economy Plan:

<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
13,500,000 tons	12,236,754 GDR tonnage 229,448 foreign tonnage	90.6
	12,466,202	92.3
1,727,000,000 tons/km	1,625,498,447 green fleet (sic) 75,874,457 foreign fleet	93.9
	1,691,372,904	98.3

The agencies in Berlin, Magdeburg and Stralsund fulfilled the plan with 101.1 percent, 90.6 percent and 80.4 percent respectively or with 91 percent, 88.5 percent and 94.5 percent of tons per kilometer.

The nationalized plans were fulfilled as follows:

a. DSU Plan

<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
2,900,000 tons	2,903,132 tons	100
368,000,000 tons/km	349,890,979	95.1

The breakdown for Berlin was 1,303,238 tons or 100.3 percent and 142,074,267 tons/km or 109.2 percent; for Magdeburg 1,115,395 tons or 92.8 percent and 176,503,063 tons/km or 84.9 percent; and for Stralsund 484,499 tons or 121.1 percent and 31,313,629 tons/km or 104.4 percent.

b. DOS Plan

<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
2,700,000 tons	2,868,615	106.2
399,000,000	372,813,278	93.4

Compared with 1952, the national economy plan showed an increase of 1,543,200 tons or 14.4 percent, and a decrease of 91,800,000 tons/km or 5.4 percent.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET/

25X1A

- 3 -

II. Reports on shipments.

Inland shipping failed to fulfill the 1952 national economy plan despite improved working conditions and an increase of tonnage capacity of 14.4 percent as compared with 1951. The decrease of tons per km resulted from the fact that the DOS fleet did not ship hard coal from Poland and, during this year, was employed on far shorter runs in the GDR which yielded a lesser output of tons per km. Another factor in the non-fulfillment was the economy which failed to employ shipping on a uniform and continuing basis. Although the tonnage required for fulfilling the shipment quota was available, about 720,000 tons of cargo, including about 400,000 tons of the rubble scheduled for shipment, were not delivered during the first five months. The other goods which failed to appear were building materials; for example, about 2,000 tons of building materials of the quota were not forthcoming in April. Other deficits which resulted from non-exploitation of available tonnage during the period from July to early September, could not be made good during October, November and December as they exceeded the carrying capacity of the fleet. While during the first six months of 1952, an average of about 200,000 tons of ship tonnage was not used for economic purposes, the idle tonnage dropped to about 100,000 tons between July and September, although the DOS fleet was added and, for example in early November, increased the fleet stock to 850,000 tons as compared with 585,000 tons during the same time in 1951. During the fall campaign in 1952, the available fleet had about 715,000 tons as compared with an average of 505,000 tons in 1951.

Other deficiencies in the fulfillment of the plan quota were caused by the low water depths in the Elbe River during the period from late July to mid-October. The water level near Dresden dropped from 1.26 meters to 0.30 meters between early July and late July and fluctuated between 0.58 and 0.31 meters in August, and between 0.26 meters and 0.81 meters between early September and mid-September, and finally rose to 1.64 meters by late September. Regular navigation on the Upper and Middle Elbe River and the Saale River had to be stopped, therefore, and about 500,000 tons of cargo could not be shipped. In November and early December, frost forced the wooden and composite barges trading on the Mecklenburg waterways and North Brandenburg to lay up and, thus, considerably delayed the rotation of the fleet.

In addition to these difficulties, the DSU operations suffered from shortcomings regarding the employment of the fleet and the fulfillment of the plan quota. For example, the agencies which, during the first months, had been established as a result of the poor utilization of shipping by water in an effort to regulate the flow of goods received no or insufficient information from the state railroads and remained unaware of goods which could be transhipped from rail to water. As this information was considered a matter of secondary importance, the results obtained were incomplete. The employment of barges was specially unsatisfactory in Berlin. Fleet control which had to concentrate on avoidance of any waiting time for ships during the fall campaign, was handled rather awkwardly and was not severe enough to reveal shortcomings in operations. Later control and supervision by DSU agencies could have remedied at least a portion of shipments not made. Also, the dispatchers obviously were not qualified for their work and, therefore, produced poor results. Establishment of a sufficient number of lighterage places made it possible to avoid congestion of grain shipping operations which, during the low water period, occurred almost every year in Niegripp. However, an increased number of congestions occurred during the last three months in 1952 and after the water depths had improved and, for example, affected the unloading of grain in Halle, that of stones in Ueckermünde and the potato supplies for Berlin. Insufficient availability of railroad cars especially at Elbe River harbors, caused comparatively long waiting times which, if avoided, would have yielded a performance of about 70,000 tons.

SECRET/

25X1

SECRET, [REDACTED]

25X1A

While the grain loading operations developed smoothly, sugar beet shipments encountered difficulties which resulted from late harvesting and early frost. Sufficient barges were available for the supply of sugar refineries in the Magdeburg and Stralsund districts, whereas temporary stoppages occurred in Mecklenburg as a result of the employment of barges for government orders.

III. Blunders and shortcomings in fleet control.

The work of the fleet control section was not up to its task during the fall period. For all the work this section did, several incidents escaped its control, thus making it possible for the operational offices to commit blunders which were noticed only subsequently. The supervision of plans was not carried out with sufficient energy by the control office and executive bodies. Although some of these deficiencies resulted from the loss of skilled personnel, they could have been reduced by better organization.

25X1A

[REDACTED] Comments:

1. As reported. Our total shows 1,701,372,904 tons/km.
2. Deutsche Oderschiffahrt.
3. Deutsche Schifffahrts - und Umschlagsbetriebszentrale.

SECRET, [REDACTED]

25X1